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 Migration in the 
Central 
Mediterranean 
 
In the last decade irregular immigration has 
emerged as a “security” challenge (in the 
language of International Relations, a non-
military “threat”) in the Mediterranean region 
particularly in the central, sub-region.
1
 The 
designation of this issue as a “security 
challenge” or “threat” is itself controversial 
and will be discussed further down. This paper 
focuses on the situation in the central 
Mediterranean involving mainly four countries 
namely Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia all of 
which have long standing historical links and 
bilateral relations and participate in the so 
called “5+5” Dialogue in the Western 
Mediterranean. Two of these Central 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Malta) are also 
EU member states and Tunisia has a long-
standing relationship with the EU [Association 
Agreement, Barcelona Process (EMP), 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM)] while Libya  so far has 
no formal relations at all with the EU.  
 
This paper analyses some of the aspects of 
migration in the central Mediterranean 
focusing on the link between the domestic and 
international politics of the issue in Italy and 
Malta and contrasting the different approaches 
taken. For example, although Italy and Malta 
both resort to self-help and both try to involve 
the EU in helping them tackle the problem, 
they do this in a markedly different way: Italy 
uses the EU as a supplement to its independent 
and bilateral efforts while Malta looks to the 
EU as the major solution to the problem. 
                                                 
1
 Mainwaring Cetta, “In the Face of Revolution: the 
Libyan Civil War and Migration Politics in Southern 
Europe”, in Calleya Stephen and Wohlfeld Monika 
(eds.), Change and Opportunities in the Emerging 
Mediterranean, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic 
Studies, Malta, 2012, p.434. 
Lacking the power and influence to deal with 
the issue, Malta tends to see the problem as 
primarily a multilateral issue or one that can 
only be tackled in concert with stronger powers 
in the region preferably within an EU context. 
On the other hand, Italy had been keen in 
involving the EU but decided to go it alone 
when this option turned out to be a dead end. 
In this paper I also try to show the extent (or 
limitations) to which multilateral initiatives 
such as the “5+5” and Euro-Mediterranean co-
operation really play a decisive role in 
incentivizing or facilitating inter-state 
cooperation or joint solutions. This paper also 
refers to the EU acquis, the notion of solidarity 
(norms) and the extent to which it is 
implemented as well as a number of connected 
issues. 
 
The subjects of this paper, the Mediterranean 
Boat People, have been referred to by various 
names in the literature, all of which may be 
more or less deficient in actually defining them 
all. They have been referred to as “illegal” or 
“irregular” immigrants, “refugees” in search of 
international protection, “migrants at sea” and 
“boat people”. The use of “boat people” 
dispenses with the need of having to define the 
various categories of migrants involved and is 
thus preferred in this paper. 
 
Immigration in the EU Treaties 
 
Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) tries to strike a balance between internal 
free movement and the protection of the 
external frontiers to control irregular influxes 
of persons: “The Union shall offer its citizens 
an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement 
of persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime.” Article 67 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) states that the EU 
“shall ensure the absence of internal border 
 
controls for persons and shall frame a common 
policy on asylum, immigration and external 
border control, based on solidarity between 
Member States, which is fair towards third-
country nationals. For the purpose of this Title, 
stateless persons shall be treated as third-
country nationals.” Irregular immigration 
features in Article 79 where it is stated that: 
“The Union shall develop a common 
immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all 
stages, the efficient management of migration 
flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals 
residing legally in Member States, and the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to 
combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in 
human beings.” The same article sanctions EU 
action adopted by the ordinary legislative 
procedure against “illegal immigration and 
unauthorised residence, including removal and 
repatriation of persons residing without 
authorization”. The EU is also authorized to 
conclude repatriation agreements with third 
countries and to adopt measures to help the 
integration of third country nationals in the 
member states. In the latter case, where the EU 
fails to act, the member states may take the 
initiative. Article 80 TFEU states that “The 
policies of the Union set out in this Chapter 
and their implementation shall be governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States. 
Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted 
pursuant to this Chapter shall contain 
appropriate measures to give effect to this 
principle.” Legal immigration remains mostly 
in the hands of national governments. 
 
The Central Mediterranean in Focus 
 
Most of the “irregular immigrants” presently in 
the EU have arrived through airports carrying 
legitimate travel documentation and then 
overstayed. As for the rest, figures provided by 
FRONTEX show that there are three major 
migratory routes in the Mediterranean: the 
Eastern, central and western routes and their 
importance in terms of migratory inflows into 
the EU are shown in Table 1.  Last year the 
central Mediterranean route emerged as the 
most important of these, largely because of the 
upheavals in North Africa. A detailed 
breakdown of the source countries of these 
irregular immigrants is provided in Table 1.  
 
Two main phases of the problem in the Central 
Mediterranean are discernible: 
(a) In the period before the Arab Spring 
and the Libyan uprising, from around 2000 
when the problem began to become more 
manifest, Tripoli was at first reluctant to co-
operate with Europe on resolving the issue 
largely because Libya itself is a transit country 
for migrants arriving there from sub-Saharan 
Africa and because of collusion between the 
regime of Colonel Gaddafi and organized 
smugglers.
2
 Libya may also have wanted to use 
irregular migration to gain leverage in its 
dealings with the EU and Italy. This phase 
came to an end after 2008 following the 
signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-
operation between Italy and Libya, according 
to which Libya began to co-operate more in 
controlling outflows and in taking back 
irregular immigrants caught  by Italian and 
Libyan naval units operating separately or 
jointly. This practice raised a plethora of 
justified human rights concerns. 
 
(b) The period after the Tunisian and 
Libyan uprisings which toppled the regimes in 
Tunis and Tripoli and which was characterized  
                                                 
2
 Human Rights Watch in its 2009 Report “Pushed Back, 
Pushed Around Italy‟s Forced Return of Boat Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers, Libya‟s Mistreatment of Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers” describes the intimate relationship 
between migrant traffickers and Libyan officials during 
colonel Gadaffi‟s times which could not have occurred 
without Tripoli actually acquiescing to it. The Report is 
accessible at 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0909web_0.
pdf (accessed 05.06.2012). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Routes 2009 2010 2011 Share 
of total 
% change on 
previous year 
Central Mediterranean Route 11 043 4 450 64 261 46 1 344 
     Tunisia 1 624 652 27 982  4 192 
     Nigeria 1 655 1 6 078  607 700 
     Not Specified 1 0 5 436  n.a. 
     Central Africa 0 0 3 703  n.a. 
Eastern Mediterranean Route 39 975 55 688 57 025 40 2.4 
   Land 11 127 40 513 55 558  1.2 
     Afghanistan 639 21 389 19 308  -9.7 
     Pakistan 1 224 3 558 13 130  269 
     Bangladesh 292 1 496 3 541  137 
   Sea 28 848 6 175 1 467  -76 
     Afghanistan 11 758 1 373 310  -77 
     Pakistan 257 148 179  21 
     Morocco 87 107 149  39 
Western Mediterranean Route 6 642 5 003 8 448 6 69 
   Sea 5 003 3 436 5 103  49 
     Algeria 3 190 1 242 1 037  -17 
     Morocco 254 300 775  158 
     Cote d‟Ivoire 85 122 466  282 
   Land 1 639 1 567 3 345  113 
     Not Specified 503 1 108 2 610  136 
     Algeria 464 459 735  60 
     Morocco 672 0 0  n.a. 
Circular route from Albania to 
Greece 
40 250 35 297 5 269 3.7 -85 
      Albania 38 017 32 451 5 022  -85 
      Serbia 48 39 46  18 
      Pakistan 21 68 44  -35 
Western Balkan Route 3 089 2 371 4 646 3.3 96 
      Afghanistan 700 469 981  109 
      Serbia 1 683 687 833  21 
      Pakistan 10 39 606  1 454 
Eastern Borders Route 1 335 1 043 990 0.7 -5.1 
      Moldova 396 393 250  -36 
      Georgia 173 144 209  45 
      Somalia 64 48 120  150 
Western African Route 2 244 196 340 0.2 73 
      Morocco 179 179 321  79 
      Senegal 186 2 4  100 
      Guinea 304 0 4  n.a. 
Other 21 3 1  -67 
Total 104 599 104 051 140 980  35 
Source: FRONTEX 
 
by huge military convulsions in Libya, led to a 
great exodus of migrants from Libya to 
bordering countries and later a huge outflow of 
boat people from Tunisia headed for Italy, 
particularly the small island of Lampedusa. 
The majority of these were Tunisian citizens, 
in search of a better life in Europe and, 
probably, trying to escape the political 
upheavals at home as well as, though less so,  
sub-Saharan Africans fleeing from economic 
hardships, authoritarianism (Eritreans) and 
state failure (Somalis).  
 
Some of the repercussions of these events 
affected the delicate balance of international 
relations in the sub-region and a few of these 
need to be underlined. The truism that the EU 
still lacks a foreign policy was brought into 
sharp relief by the internal bickering and 
infighting on how the North African crises, and 
particularly that in Libya, should be handled. 
This of course led to national foreign policies 
(actions) filling the gap. The EU was not 
flexible enough  to act promptly and in real 
time.  In addition, sub-regional bilateral and 
multilateral relations (e.g. 5+5) were shaken 
and short-circuited. This was replicated in the 
case of migration: the absence of an EU policy, 
the failure of regional initiatives such as the “5 
+ 5” all played their part. Then, as national 
policies, or should we say national interest took 
over,  the respect for human rights and the rule 
of law, one of the EU‟s biggest foreign policy 
fantasies, were tossed into the sea. On the last 
point, and without being overtly emotional, one 
observation will suffice for the moment: in 
2012, the world commemorated the centenary 
of the sinking of the Titanic with an estimated 
loss of 1,514 of its passengers. That is roughly 
how many migrants are believed to have 
drowned at sea in the Mediterranean in 2011 
alone, tragically unwept by many.
3
 
                                                 
3
  UNHCR “Mediterranean takes record as most deadly 
stretch of water for refugees and migrants in 2011”, 
Briefing Notes, 31 January 2012, at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4f27e01f9.html (accessed 
30.10.2012) 
 
Malta – Threat Perceptions and the 
Limitations of Self-Help 
 
In the Spring 2011 edition of the Standard 
Eurobarometer EU citizens were asked “what 
do you think are the most important issues 
facing (y)our country?”  The Maltese put 
Inflation first with 42%, Migration second with 
31% (down from 48% in the autumn 2008) 
with energy in  third place   with 16%. 
Migration had been toppled from first place as 
an issue of concern. What explains this slight 
change in public attitudes between 2008 and 
2011 is straightforward: in 2008 the number of 
boat people arriving in Malta peaked but then 
the impact of the Italo-Libyan Friendship and 
Co-operation Treaty drastically reduced the 
flow from Libya in the whole of the central 
Mediterranean region with a positive ricochet 
effect on Malta. Although in 2011 we 
witnessed a mass exodus of migrants from 
Tunisia, Malta was relatively less affected by 
it. In addition, the onslaught of the financial 
crisis and the euro zone turbulence shifted 
public attention in most countries to it and 
marginalized all other issues. 
 
However, immigration still remains high in the 
Maltese citizens‟ “threat perceptions” and it 
only requires a few boat landings on Malta‟s 
shores for it to begin rising again. The Maltese 
public perceives the problem as a security 
challenge and Maltese political elites have 
been responsible for creating this perception. 
However, whether it is indeed a security threat 
needs to be assessed carefully. A UNHCR 
survey on Maltese public attitudes carried out 
in 2012 found that “just over 50% of the 
respondents indicate that they think there are 
too many migrants and refugees arriving in 
their locality… A majority of 54% did not 
consider migration to be a threat to their way 
of life in the local community though there 
were significant regional differences on this 
 
point.”4 The survey also found that young 
respondents generally expressed less concern. 
The survey confirms that there is strong public 
concern and some of its other data not quoted 
here also shows the extent of public 
misperceptions on immigration. 
 
Several factors explain this perception 
influences Malta‟s domestic politics and 
foreign policy. First there is the cultural 
dimension: Malta was simply unprepared for 
this sudden influx of immigrants. Then there 
are the usual reactions that occur when a large 
number of people start arriving by boat on a 
country‟s shores, which can easily conjure 
images – which are in turn manipulated – of an 
invasion and extrapolated further into a threat 
to national identity. 
 
For a small vulnerable country with a 
miniscule land area (316 km
2
), a high 
population density and no resources, the art of 
survival practiced over millennia has shaped 
several underlying, shared and inherited 
perceptions, which lead to a reflex action of 
rejection/reaction/resistance (3Rs) when the 
population is faced with a real or potential 
threat. From the initial phases of the problem 
populist fear was fanned by a combination of 
rightist groups using the “new media” such as 
the internet. Fear of irregular immigrants 
echoed in the press and often among religious 
pundits referring to the “Islamization” of 
Malta,
5
 commentators linking the phenomenon 
                                                 
4
 UNHCR, “What do you think? A report on public perception about 
refugees and migrants in Malta – 2012” at 
www.unhcr.org.mt/media/com_form2content/documents/c8/a456/f40/w
hat%20do%20you%20think_PPR%202012%20UNHCR%20.pdf  
(accessed 35.10.2012).  
5
 See for example the prominence that migration to 
Malta is given in such blogs as “Islamization Watch” at 
http://islamizationwatch.blogspot.com/. At the height of 
the divorce referendum in Malta, The Times of Malta of 
Saturday 21 May 2011 under the heading “Approving 
divorce may open the door to radical Islam” quoted 
Stephen Schwartz, a U.S. Muslim author and researcher 
on the Islamic world as saying that the acceptance of 
divorce in Malta would facilitate the introduction of 
Islamic Law. 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110521/lo
cal/approving-divorce-may-open-the-door-to-radical-
with terrorist penetration,
6
 a government which 
did not know how to handle the problem and 
an opposition which knew how to profit from 
the issue. Catholic Organizations which tried to 
provide humanitarian aid to the migrants were 
harassed by „unknown groups‟ and the Jesuit 
Refugee Service (JRS) suffered two arson 
attacks in 2006. Notwithstanding, JRS remains 
in the forefront of the humanitarian effort.
7
 
 
Malta has concurrently pursued three policy 
initiatives: self help, bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation and solidarity within the EU. On 
the domestic front it isolated irregular 
immigrants from the rest of the population by 
keeping them in ‘open centres’. 
 
EU Solidarity 
 
Malta‟s immigration challenge more or less 
began to intensify around the time that it joined 
the EU. However, there is no direct causal link 
between the two events and as Derek 
Lutterbeck has argued the increase in irregular 
immigration in Malta occurred at the same 
time when the whole of the Mediterranean 
region witnessed a surge in such immigration.
8
 
However, this is unlikely because most 
irregular immigrants, not wishing to end up 
marooned on the “off shore” EU state of Malta, 
target continental Europe as their ultimate 
destination. Leaving aside this argument, Malta 
tried to use its position in the EU to buttress 
                                                                             
islam.366485 (accessed  23.05.2011). The writer has 
frequently met people who express fear of 
“Islamization” through migration. 
6
 For example when reporting on Malta, United States 
Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 
2008 - Malta, 30 April 2009, refers to this fear. See the 
report at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf p.84. 
7
 Massimo Farrugia, “Jesuits see links between 
suspected arson attacks”, The Times of Malta, Tuesday, 
March 14, 2006, at  
www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20060314/local/je
suits-see-links-between-suspected-arson-attacks.60328 
(accessed 09.06.2012). 
8
 Lutterbeck Derek, “Small Frontier Island: Malta and 
the Challenge of Irregular Immigration”, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 20:1, Winter 2009, p.122. 
 
EU policies/actions to enable it to cope with 
this phenomenon. 
 
The Maltese authorities‟ main argument is that 
given Malta‟s population density (1,381 per 
km
2
 in 2010 as compared to 116 per km
2 
for 
the EU 27) which is the highest in the EU, 
many of the irregular immigrants granted 
international protection needed to be relocated 
to other countries to lessen their impact on 
Maltese society. As Lutterbeck also observes, 
unlike other Mediterranean islands, Malta has 
no hinterland where to locate the immigrants 
and the Dublin Convention does not allow 
them to move on to the rest of the EU.
9
  For 
this reason Maltese representatives in the EU 
institutions constantly insisted on (1) the need 
for an EU-wide Asylum Policy based on 
“burden” or “responsibility” sharing; (2) the 
reform of the so called “Dublin 2” Regulation 
which amongst other things permits member 
states to return asylum seekers to the country 
where they first entered the EU; (3) the 
strengthening of the EU Border Agency, 
FRONTEX (European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union) and (4) the adoption of a 
holistic longer-term approach to the problem 
based on the strengthening of EU development 
policy in the source countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
As shall become more evident further on, 
because of its smallness and lack of power, 
Malta is constrained to look for a multilateral 
or “European Solution” to the migratory 
challenges it faces. Italy had  done the same 
thing however, when such a solution was not 
forthcoming, it concluded its own bilateral 
arrangement with Libya. The latter option was 
not possible in Malta‟s case since it does not 
command the level of resources that Italy was 
able to deploy in the Italo-Libyan co-operation 
agreement. 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. pp.121-123. 
The first proposal for “burden sharing” was 
launched by Malta in 2005 when the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs presented the EU 
ambassadors in Valletta with a 17 point paper 
in which he proposed the resettlement of some 
irregular immigrants in the EU.
10
 But it was 
only four years later that the EU Council began 
to adopt measures to implement this proposal 
and which eventually led to the establishment 
of the pilot project for intra-EU reallocation of 
migrants from Malta (EUREMA) which 
permitted member states to voluntarily resettle 
refugees from Malta. 
 
In another development, in 2011 the legal 
standing of the Dublin 2 regulation was thrown 
in doubt by a judgement of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECrHR) and another 
judgement in two joined cases by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). On the 21 December 
2011 (Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10) 
the ECJ decided that “An asylum seeker may 
not be transferred to a Member State where he 
risks being subjected to inhuman treatment. EU 
law does not permit a conclusive presumption 
that Member States observe the fundamental 
rights conferred on asylum seekers.” The ECJ 
judgement followed on another by the ECrHR 
sitting as a Grand Chamber which was 
delivered on 21 January 2011 in the case of 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, concerning the 
Belgian authorities' transfer of an asylum 
seeker to Greece on the basis of Council 
Regulation No. 343/2003 (Dublin 2). The 
ECrHR found that Belgium and Greece had 
violated Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an 
effective remedy) read in conjunction with 
Article 3 of the Convention.
11
 In brief, the 
decisions mean that when EU member states 
employ “Dublin 2” to return immigrants to 
                                                 
10
 The “17 points” were published in a Department of 
Information (Malta) Press Release, No 1038, 10 July 
2005. 
11
Reflets, European Court of Justice, Brief information 
on legal developments of Community Interest, Library, 
Documentation and Research Directorate No. 1/2011. 
 
countries that are already experiencing 
enormous challenges due to the exceptional 
number of migrants arriving at their borders, 
and where doubts exist that 
asylum procedures are flawed and the 
conditions for reception of asylum seekers are 
inadequate, it cannot be presumed that their 
rights will be protected. Hence, returning 
migrants in such conditions to other EU 
member states is considered to be in breach of 
human rights. 
 
As of the 26 October 2012, the Council and 
Parliament had reached agreement on an 
amended Dublin Regulation. Negotiations 
were still taking place on what has been 
vaguely described as “comitology-related” 
issues. One of the new provisions introduced 
by this amended Regulation is a mechanism for 
early warning, preparedness and crisis 
management by which the practical 
functioning of national asylum systems are 
evaluated in order to provide timely help to 
member states in need and prevent asylum 
crises from getting out of hand. The 
amendments are intended to provide for 
measures to prevent asylum crises from 
developing, rather than addressing the 
consequences of such crises when they occur.
12
 
As such it falls short of expectations of those 
countries like Malta which wished to see more 
radical changes to Dublin 2 and the 
introduction of a “burden sharing” mechanism 
comprising compulsory relocation of persons 
given protection.  
 
The Dublin Regulation is only one of several 
EU legal measures which collectively make up 
the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) which is meant to be completely in 
place by the end of 2012. The CEAS also 
includes the Directive on Reception Conditions 
                                                 
12
 Background Note on the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council, Luxembourg 25-26 October 2012, published in 
Brussels on the 24 October, at 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/press
Data/en/jha/133162.pdf#page=3  (accessed 02.11.2012) 
for Asylum-seekers, a directive on 
qualification for an applicant to acquire refugee 
status or to have subsidiary protection and a 
Directive on Asylum procedures.  
 
The establishment of a system for “early 
warning preparedness and management of 
asylum seekers” which is a Dublin 2 
amendment received the Council‟s blessings in 
March 2012.
13
 This system does not fully meet 
the demands of a number of countries such as 
Malta. In the meantime the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) has indicated in its 
2013 Action Plan the objectives of the early 
warning mechanism without showing how this 
is to be done in practice: “EASO's early 
warning and Preparedness System can indicate 
the need for special support to EU Member 
States for their asylum systems. This can lead 
to special support (tailor-made solutions, 
capacity building and relocation) to Member 
States in a situation where potential particular 
pressure could emerge. Supporting on a 
number of areas and further improving the 
quality of the asylum process in the context of 
the Common European Asylum System.”14 
With respect to “relocation” the Action Plan 
says that the EASO “will support any further 
development of relocation activities among 
Member States in 2013 building upon 
experiences from the evaluation of EUREMA 
and other bi-lateral relocation activities from 
Malta carried out by the European Commission 
together with participating Member States and 
EASO during 2012”(ibid.). 
 
EUREMA 
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 3151st JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council 
meeting, “Council conclusions on a Common 
Framework for genuine and practical solidarity towards 
Member States facing particular pressures on their 
asylum systems, including through mixed migration 
flows”, Brussels, 8 March 2012. 
14European Asylum Support Agency, “EASO Work 
Programme 2013”, page 22 at 
www.easo.europa.eu/documents/20120926%20WP2013
%20for%20submission%20EP%20EC%20Council%20F
INAL.pdf   (accessed 30.10.2012). 
 
Malta‟s approach in the EU is two pronged, 
comprising concurrent and complimentary 
action (or synchronized effort) within the 
Council and the European Parliament.  In 
2010, the EU launched the Relocation from 
Malta (EUREMA) project which was renewed 
in 2011 following a European Commission 
Communication which highlighted inter alia 
that “Some Member States, such as Italy, 
Malta, Greece and Cyprus are more directly 
exposed to massive arrivals of irregular 
migrants and, to a limited extent, of persons in 
need of international protection (and that 
therefore) this is not a national problem alone, 
but needs also to be addressed at the EU level 
and requires true solidarity amongst Member 
States”15.  
 
In 2011, the EU also established the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) in Malta with 
the role of assisting in the development of the 
Common European Asylum System. The 
setting up of the agency is just a first step in 
possibly tackling asylum issues more 
coherently at EU level. The EU now needs an 
effective common asylum policy and to 
improve its immigration policy which would 
be the next logical step in the trend that we 
have seen developing in the EU asylum policy 
namely from migration being a matter of 
national competence to one which is 
increasingly becoming more dominated by 
inter-state cooperation and supranationalism.  
 
Many countries have responded positively to 
Malta‟s predicament and accepted to relocate 
immigrants in their countries. Data provided by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) shows that between 2005 
and October 2012, 1,740 refugees have been 
relocated in foreign countries, 1056 of them in 
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the USA, the rest in Europe (including the EU) 
and elsewhere. The USA resettlement 
programme thus served Malta‟s interests much 
better than the EU‟s. 
 
 
Human Rights Concerns 
 
A lull in arrivals between 2008 and 2010 was 
due, as has already been indicated, to the 
successful repulsion of boat people by joint 
Italian-Libyan naval patrols under the 2008 
Italy-Libya Treaty of Friendship. This also 
meant Italy‟s externalization of its border 
control to Libya. Human Rights organizations 
and the Council of Europe criticized this 
“throw back” policy and similar practices in 
the Central Mediterranean, mainly because the 
irregular immigrants involved were not given 
the opportunity to apply for international 
protection before they were forced back. The 
European Court for Human Rights (ECrHR) 
has found state practice to have contravened 
the European Human Rights Convention 
(ECHR). For example, on the 23 February 
2012, the ECrHR found that Italy had 
contravened Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights as well as 
several other national and European laws by 
returning a group of mainly Somali and 
Eritrean migrants to Libya thus exposing them 
to torture and inhuman treatment both in Libya 
and in their own countries when it was 
abundantly evident that Libya was not 
observing international law in the treatment of 
migrants. The Court declared that by 
“transferring the applicants to Libya, the Italian 
authorities, in full knowledge of the facts, 
exposed them to treatment proscribed by the 
Convention”.16 
 
There is no excuse for the abuse of human 
rights or for the disrespect being shown to the 
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age-old international principle of non-
refoulement. At the same time it seems evident 
that if progress is registered on an EU common 
asylum policy and a common mobility policy 
in the Mediterranean region, this may relieve 
some of the pressure on the southern EU 
member states. 
 
Italy Self-Help - The Benghazi Accord 
 
Italo-Libyan joint handling of irregular 
immigration is related to the Treaty on 
Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation 
between Italy and Libya concluded in 
Benghazi in 2008. Natalino Ronziti highlights 
the importance of Article 19 of the Treaty 
which refers to previous agreements reached 
by the two sides in 2000 and 2007.
17
 Indeed the 
title of Article 19 is almost identical to the 
2000 Treaty title.
18
 Reflecting the 
“securitization” of the discourse on migration, 
the 2000 and 2008 Treaties controversially 
conflate irregular migration with terrorism and 
illegal smuggling. Furthermore, as Mainwaring 
observes the 2008 Benghazi Treaty did not 
include a formal readmission clause.
19
 But the 
Italian authorities, particularly the Berlusconi 
Government, were quick to seek and find a 
justification for their “throw back” policy of 
forced repatriation by reference to past Italo-
Libyan accords and international conventions. 
This claim raises some perplexities as to which 
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 Mainwaring, p.440.  
parts of the agreements and international 
conventions this “justification” is based on. 
 
The background to these agreements in brief is 
the following. On the 13 December 2000 the 
two sides signed a co-operation agreement in 
Rome on fighting terrorism, organized crime, 
drug trafficking and irregular immigration 
further obliging the signatories to exchange 
information on all these issues including 
irregular migration. According to article 1D (3) 
they were to provide “Reciproca assistenza e 
cooperazione nella lotta contro l‟immigrazione 
illegale”20 Two protocols on irregular 
immigration signed in Tripoli on the 29 
December 2007 refer to the 2000 Treaty but as 
Ronzitti observes they were never 
implemented.
21
 One of the protocols stipulated 
that Italy would lend Libya six naval vessels 
which would be operated by mixed Italian and 
Libyan crews to patrol the points of departure 
and routes used by boats involved in the 
transport of irregular immigrants, in Libyan as 
well as international waters. These naval 
operations were obliged to respect 
“convenzioni internazionali vigenti, secondo le 
modalita operative che saranno definite delle 
competenti autorita dei due paesi.”22 Italy also 
agreed to provide Libya with three additional 
naval vessels over a period of three years from 
the signing of the protocol. The agreement 
stipulated that Italy would seek EU funding to 
cover the cost of the naval vessels and also to 
finance a surveillance system for Libya‟s land 
and sea borders in order to control irregular 
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immigration. Similarly, Italy promised to help 
start development projects in Libya and the 
countries of origin of irregular immigration 
with EU funds while Libya was to reach 
agreements with these same countries to reduce 
irregular migration and to accept the 
repatriation of migrants.
23
  The second protocol 
signed on the same day was a technical one 
detailing the practical, logistical and operative 
aspects of the cooperation agreement.
24
 Both 
Libya and Italy are signatories to the 2000 UN 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime which in Article 8 details 
how repatriation of victims of illegal 
trafficking can occur – but which can hardly be 
interpreted as permitting involuntary 
repatriation. Indeed the Protocol states that: 
 
“…such return shall be with due 
regard for the safety of that person 
and for the status of any legal 
proceedings related to the fact that the 
person is a victim of trafficking and 
shall preferably be voluntary.”25 
 
The Benghazi Treaty was instrumental 
in controlling the flow of irregular 
immigrants from Libya and Malta 
benefitted from it indirectly. During the 
Libyan civil war which lasted between 
February and October 2011, the Treaty 
was suspended but subsequently 
reactivated after a meeting in Rome in 
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December between the Italian Premier 
Mario Monti and the leader of the 
Libyan National Transitional Council 
Mustafa Abdul Jalil. 
 
 
Malta Suspends Participation in 
FRONTEX 
 
In 2010, Malta suspended its participation in 
the FRONTEX missions on the grounds that 
the rules of engagement specified that migrants 
rescued at sea had to be taken to the country 
hosting the mission. Malta has never accepted 
this principle since it is responsible under the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for 
a huge Search and Rescue Area (SAR) which 
at 250,000 km
2
 is the size of the United 
Kingdom. This area stretching from Tunisia to 
Crete is a colonial legacy. Pressure has been 
Building up on Malta, particularly from Italy, 
to relinquish part of it but this is resisted 
strongly in Valletta which sees control of the 
SAR as a matter of sovereignty. 
 
 
Source: Search and Rescue Training Centre, Malta 
at www.sarmalta.gov.mt/sar_in_Malta.htm. 
 
In the last decade disputes have frequently 
erupted between Malta and Italy, at times even 
spilling over into the media, on who should 
take responsibility for migrants rescued at sea 
in Malta‟s SAR. Malta has always insisted that 
they should be landed at the nearest port. On 
occasions Italy responded by declaring the port 
of Lampedusa “unsafe” thus stopping rescued 
migrants from being landed there. Standoffs 
 
led to inaction when migrants in danger were 
denied help as the diplomats haggled over 
responsibility for them. A March 2012 Council 
of Europe Report showed how Libya, Italy, 
Malta and NATO failed to help a boat in 
distress as a result of which 63 migrants on 
board lost their lives.
26
 Several similar 
incidents have been recorded in the last decade 
which are too numerous to enumerate here.
27
 
 
Malta’s Efforts in the European 
Parliament 
 
Malta has little avenues to press on its 
diplomatic objectives and what may seem as 
less efficacious tools to use by some member 
states have more importance to small states. In 
addition, in small states some initiatives may 
depend on the policy initiative and political 
acumen of a single individual as opposed to 
what happens in larger states where a whole 
bureaucratic setup involving several 
individuals is the norm.  
 
The growing strength of the European 
Parliament in the EU legislative process, 
particularly since the Lisbon Treaty went into 
effect, has not passed unnoticed by Malta as a 
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potential route to influencing „favourable‟ 
changes in EU policies of primary importance 
in the handling of migration. Indeed, the 
European Parliament has become a 
complimentary means to Malta‟s activity in 
Council to lobby for EU aid and to ensure that 
sufficient financial resources are allocated in 
the EU budget to tackle the problem of the boat 
people. FRONTEX‟s performance is also 
closely scrutinized by the EP and the Maltese 
MEPs are conscious of potential influence they 
can exercise on the agency through the 
Parliament. Indeed, one of Malta‟s six MEP‟s 
rose to a position of leadership and expertise 
on migration and asylum issues which was the 
main external challenges confronting Malta 
when it joined the EU in 2004. Beginning with 
the 2004-2009 legislature Dr Simon Busuttil 
MEP as member of the EP Budgetary 
Committee and the Budgetary Control 
Committee, successfully lobbied for the 
increase in EU funding to FRONTEX and kept 
up the pressure to ensure that the agency 
committed substantial resources to deal with 
the migration challenge in the Mediterranean. 
In 2004 the European Commission sent a 
technical mission to Libya to report on 
immigration
28
 and in December 2005, Dr 
Busuttil was elected Chairman of an ad hoc 
European Parliament Delegation to Libya to 
investigate the situation on illegal immigration. 
In 2008 he was appointed EP Rapporteur on a 
Common Immigration Policy and the report 
was adopted in April 2009. Dr Busuttil 
proposed the establishment of a burden-sharing 
mechanism and secured the allocation of the 
first €5 million in the EU budget to start its 
operation (2008), he drafted the EPP-ED 
electoral program on immigration (2008), 
became the EPP-ED spokesperson on 
FRONTEX from which position he worked to 
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increase the FRONTEX budget so as to better 
support and extend maritime missions in the 
Mediterranean which were initially for two 
months in 2007, six months in 2008 and finally 
up to 12 months in 2009. In 2006 he prepared 
an EP opinion on the European External 
Borders Fund from which Malta was allocated 
€112m to help it cope with irregular 
immigration. Apart from this he was a member 
of various Parliamentary Delegations on 
immigration including those which visited 
Tripoli, Dakar, Washington, Amsterdam and 
Warsaw. 
 
At the start of the second legislature (2009-
2014) Dr Busuttil also became the EPP-ED 
spokesperson on the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) which eventually was 
established in Malta. A year later he was 
appointed EP rapporteur on the review of the 
mandate of FRONTEX. The main issue from 
Malta‟s point of view is that as a small state 
with limited human resources it often finds 
itself in a situation in which a successful policy 
pursued in a particular domain often rests on a 
single individual and this may often lead to a 
lack of continuity. Hence it remains to be seen 
whether in the future this stance in the 
European Parliament becomes a course which 
is regularly pursued by Malta or not. 
 
Multilateral Relations – The Main 
Mediterranean Initiatives 
 
Turning to multilateral initiatives there are 
three types that need to be assessed: (a) the 
“5+5” dialogue, (b) other EU policies such as 
the Barcelona Process and the Neighbourhood 
Policy and (c) inter-parliamentary co-
operation/diplomacy. In its foreign policy 
objectives, Malta declares that it wants a 
“holistic approach” to the immigration problem 
that would include not only measures at EU 
level, aid and cooperation with the North 
African transit countries, the resettlement of 
immigrants in their own countries but also 
concrete action to improve the situation in the 
countries which are the source of origin of 
migration.
29
 This policy is roughly also in line 
with the policy objective of most of the EU 
member states. 
 
(a) The “5 + 5” 
 
From 2001 the problem of  migration began to 
gain attention in the “5+5” Dialogue30 in the 
Western Mediterranean and in January of that 
year at the foreign ministers‟ meeting in 
Lisbon it was agreed that regional cooperation 
on migration should be stepped up and a 
regular dialogue held. The first ministerial 
conference on migration was organized in 
Tunis in 2002 and a year later at the Rabat 
Conference ministers agreed on more specific 
action including “the joint management of the 
movement of people, strengthening of human 
exchanges and the fight against migrant 
trafficking by combating networks of 
smugglers, and illegal immigration in 
general… the rights and obligations of 
migrants and their integration in host societies 
and joint approaches to development, involving 
the exchange of information about multilateral 
actions to combat poverty and local 
development measures in regions with a high 
migration potential, especially in cooperation 
with migrant associations.”31  Further progress 
was made in Algiers in 2004 when it was 
decided to give more attention to the need of 
strengthening the development of the countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa from where most of the 
migrants originated.  
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A joint Maltese-Libyan paper on migration was 
presented at the foreign ministers‟ meeting 
held in Malta in June 2005 and a month later 
Malta asked the EU “to support proposals 
made in the Maltese-Libyan Joint Paper on 
Immigration endorsed by the 5+5 Ministerial 
Meeting held in Malta on the 29 and 30 June 
2005, and in particular for the High Level 
Meeting on Illegal Immigration scheduled to 
be held in Tripoli towards the beginning of 
2006 and in Malta later in the year with the 
participation of countries of destination, 
countries of transit, and countries of origin.
32 
Then, at the last meeting of the foreign 
ministers of the 5+5 which took place in Villa 
Madama in Rome on 20 February 2012, the 
Italian foreign Minister Giulio Terzi di 
Sant'Agata stressed the need for concrete co-
operation between the northern and southern 
shore Mediterranean countries to tackle the 
migration problem.
33
 
 
In the Malta Declaration adopted at the end of 
the Second Summit of the Heads of State and 
Government of the Member States of the 
Western Mediterranean Forum 5+5 Dialogue 
which was held in Valletta between the 5-6 
October 2012, a lengthy reference to the issue 
of migration was included which emphasized 
the respect of human rights and strengthening 
of consultations between the ministers and the 
EU and the facilitation of: the integration of 
legally established migrants in host countries, 
the reintegration of migrants in the countries of 
origin and the transfer of migrant remittances. 
The heads of state and government called for 
stronger measures to combat illegal 
immigration, the removal of obstacles to the 
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integration of legal migrants by combating 
racism and xenophobia, the adoption of a new 
global and balanced approach to mobility, 
which would include circular mobility, joint 
management of migratory flows and co-
development. Support was also reiterated for 
more dialogue on migration, mobility and 
security between the Mediterranean countries 
and the European Union with a view to 
agreeing on mutually satisfactory 
arrangements. In this regard, the declaration 
welcomed the start of the dialogue on mobility 
partnerships between the European Union and 
certain Mediterranean countries.
34
 The main 
challenge is whether the countries of the 5+5 
and the EU have the political energy reserves 
to pursue this ambitious agenda or whether 
substantial parts of it are left to wither away 
from neglect. At the Malta meeting a migration 
task force was set up but only time will tell 
whether this proves to be effective. 
 
The other problem with the “5+5” dialogue is 
that, lacking robust institutional structures, 
concrete action depends entirely on the 
goodwill of the participating states and the 
resources that they are willing to commit to it. 
Periodically the Dialogue encounters 
difficulties as happened in 2011 when the 
summit scheduled to be held in Malta had to be 
postponed because of the situation in Libya 
and as happened again in the case of the 
November 2011 ministerial meeting which 
eventually convened in Rome in February 
2012. However, this dialogue is important for 
it permits the countries involved the possibility 
of discussing migration on a regular basis and 
then to try and follow up matters through 
bilateral diplomacy or in other Mediterranean 
processes such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
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Partnership / UfM and the southern dimension 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and in the EU. 
 
(b) EU Mediterranean Policies 
 
The 1995 Barcelona Declaration made a 
lengthy reference to migration 
 
“(The Mediterranean Partners) 
acknowledge the importance of the 
role played by migration in their 
relationships. They agree to 
strengthen their cooperation to reduce 
migratory pressures, among other 
things through vocational training 
programmes and programmes of 
assistance for job creation. They 
undertake to guarantee protection of 
all the rights recognized under 
existing legislation of migrants 
legally resident in their respective 
territories;  
 
In the area of illegal immigration they 
decide to establish closer cooperation. 
In this context, the partners, aware of 
their responsibility for readmission, 
agree to adopt the relevant provisions 
and measures, by means of bilateral 
agreements or arrangements, in order 
to readmit their nationals who are in 
an illegal situation.”35 
 
It is not the aim here to comprehensively trace 
the handling of migration in the Barcelona 
Process since 1995, but in an appraisal of its 
achievements and failures made by Haizam 
Amirah Fernández and Richard Youngs on its 
tenth anniversary, it was observed that: 
 
One problem facing the EU is the 
persistence of a deeply-rooted 
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36
 
 
In its first reaction to the Arab Spring the 
Commission has indicated immigration as one 
of the areas in which it wishes to work for 
improvements with its Mediterranean Partners. 
The Commission has proposed the conclusion 
of mobility partnerships which would 
strengthen legal migration while measures to 
combat irregular migration are strengthened.
37
 
This was also taken up by the 5+5 2012 Malta 
meeting. 
 
(c) Parliamentary Diplomacy 
 
Mediterranean migration is an issue that has 
also gained the attention of several inter-
parliamentary initiatives what is often referred 
to as Parliamentary Diplomacy.  The Council 
of Europe has a Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Population which frequently 
turns its lenses on migratory challenges in the 
Mediterranean region.
38
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The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Mediterranean (PAM) whose Secretariat is in 
Malta was established in 2006 at an inaugural 
conference in Jordan. Migration came to 
prominence at the Malta meeting held the 
following year when a resolution was 
unanimously adopted both by the Second 
Committee on Economic, Social and 
Environmental Co-operation where it was 
proposed, as well as the plenary, where it was 
endorsed.
39
 PAM established a Special Task 
Force on Migration which submitted a report 
and a resolution at the Monaco Meeting 
(2008). The following year in Istanbul the Task 
Force presented a report and resolution on 
“forced Mediterranean migration” while in 
2010 in Morocco the focus turned to 
Palestinian women refugees. Finally, at the 
2011 Sixth Plenary meeting in Italy a report 
and resolution were presented by Tasos 
Mitsopoulos of Cyprus on the “Revolutions 
and Migrations - Impact of the Arab Spring on 
the movement of people in the region” which 
highlighted the plight of the migrants at sea. 
All the resolutions were unanimously adopted 
by the Plenary.
40
 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly (EMPA) formerly the Euro-
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Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum which has 
become the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM), is 
another regional parliamentary forum where 
immigration is discussed. The topic first came 
up in Bari in June 2002 at the fourth Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum and 
reference to it was again made in the final 
declaration of the March 2004 Vouliagmeni 
(Athens) plenary of the EMPA. In 2006, the 
EMPA adopted a recommendation tabled on 
behalf of the Committee on Improving Quality 
of Life, Exchanges between Civil Societies and 
Culture chaired by Mr Mario Greco, which 
included a lengthy and elaborate seventeen 
point statement on immigration.
41
 This 
recommendation covered nearly all the 
elements of the migration issue such as the 
need to help the development of the countries 
of origin including a co-development strategy, 
the need to increase economic aid to the 
southern Mediterranean rim countries, the need 
to fight people trafficking, respect for human 
rights in the treatment of migrants, the 
adoption of a burden sharing system within the 
EU and the setting up of a common asylum and 
immigration policy.  Four years later the 2008 
Athens Plenary discussed proposals on how to 
improve the management of legal immigration, 
particularly “to ensure full portability of 
pension rights, also in countries of origin.”42  
 
The EU‟s parliamentary diplomacy in the 
Mediterranean region – the EMPA and UfM-
PA – has been rather weakened with the 
launching of the UfM which saw a shift 
towards more inter-governmentalism and a 
deliberate attempt to weaken its role as the 
parliamentary dimension of the UfM. The 
gradual strengthening of democracy in North 
                                                 
41
 Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 
Recommendation, adopted on the basis of the draft 
tabled on behalf of the Committee on Improving Quality 
of Life, Exchanges between Civil Societies and Culture 
by Mr Mario GRECO, Chairman, Brussels, and 27 
March 2006. 
42
 Final Declaration, Fourth Plenary Session, Greek 
Parliament, Athens 28 March 2008. 
 
Africa may open new possibilities for 
parliamentary diplomacy. 
 
There is no doubt that migration and all issues 
related to it, have drawn the attention of the 
regional parliamentary fora. The question that 
is often asked is whether this led to any 
concrete action given that such parliamentary 
recommendations or declarations have no legal 
force. The main advantage gained from such 
fora derive from the fact that those who work 
on these reports are parliamentarians who 
normally have strong links with civil society in 
their countries (constituencies) and therefore 
are able to inject in these international 
parliamentary “dialogues” the challenges being 
faced on the ground. These parliamentary fora 
strengthen mutual understanding and when the 
declarations that are adopted by them become a 
point of reference in policy debates or are used 
in the policy lobbying, i.e. they enter the 
policy-making nexus at national or EU level, 
and they help in the evolution of policy and 
political action. The role of parliamentary co-
operation in general in the Mediterranean 
region is more likely to deepen if democracy 
and democratically elected parliaments are 
consolidated further in the southern shore 
countries particularly after the Arab spring. 
This counts as well for their role in tackling the 
immigration issue.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Southern European states have often been 
criticised for exaggerating the effects of 
irregular immigration with the aim of securing 
EU aid. Without entering into the merits of this 
argument it is important to stress that migration 
is linked to public perceptions and often to 
populism as happened in Greece and 
elsewhere. As the economic situation in the 
southern European countries worsens this 
danger must not be overestimated. There is 
also a case for not overly “securitizing” the 
issue without neglecting that it nonetheless 
poses a security threat if not in deed at least in 
public perceptions (though this is not the same 
for all countries). There is the issue of internal 
displacements in the southern Mediterranean 
states following the Arab Spring and the 
ongoing civil war in Syria, an issue that was 
not broached in this paper. This is a real 
problem requiring real solutions. Hence, the 
situation with Italy and Malta which is 
assessed in this paper provides only part of the 
whole picture of the broader situation in the 
rest of the Mediterranean.  
 
The solution of the problem requires a number 
of measures, some of which are designed to 
meet short-term pressures while others will 
have a longer term effect. They comprise 
measures in the EU and neighbouring transit 
states in the Central Mediterranean as well as 
development aid to the countries of origin, 
measures to encourage voluntary resettlement 
and policies to improve regular migration to 
the EU. It is also evident that the need for an 
effective EU Asylum policy which seems to be 
close to conclusion by the end of 2012 is also 
urgent in tackling irregular immigration. 
 
The phenomenon of the Mediterranean boat 
people also raises a number of normative and 
ethical considerations such as the issue of 
solidarity from whichever angle one looks at it. 
It is a question of solidarity towards the 
immigrants themselves many of whom are 
victims of abuse in their own countries and in 
the long and arduous trek of their escape to 
freedom. It is an issue of internal EU-solidarity 
which has been visibly lacking – in fact the 
lack of solidarity has accentuated the 
securitization of the issue as some member 
states were left to fend for themselves as best 
as they could or knew. Furthermore, one must 
not overlook the impact that un regulated 
migration is having on the domestic politics of 
southern European countries as reflected in the 
increase in racism and xenophobia. 
 
The EU calculus must not be based on 
expectation that the Mediterranean states 
 
whether the southern or northern rim ones, are 
willing to act as its sentinels or gate keepers. 
The EU therefore needs to move quickly on (i) 
a common asylum policy and the reform of 
Dublin 2; (ii) a Mobility framework for 
common regular migration, seasonal labour 
movements, tourist and student visas that will 
lift the excessive pressure on the southern 
states and (iii) a working burden or 
responsibility sharing scheme to ensure that the 
burden is spread out more evenly in the EU 
and (iv) more economic and trade concessions 
to the Mediterranean southern states to help 
their economies and their job-creation potential 
take off and (v) longer term treatment of the 
root-cause of  migratory flows namely the lack 
of development and state failure in Africa and 
Afghanistan. These are challenging issues for 
an EU which is economically gasping for 
breath. 
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